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The processes of making foreign policy decisions and forming assumptions about the 
nature of the “other” comprise major challenges to the transformation of conflictual 
relationships and construction of an enduring peace in Northeast Asia. In this article, 
in order to make progress towards these goals, methodologies for unpacking the 
“black box of decision,” understanding the “other,” deconstructing the relationship 
between positions and interests, and increasing the role played by non-state and sub-
state actors are explored. The paper first assesses theoretical and practical tools used 
for addressing the problems. It then considers other conflictual relationships that 
have faced similar obstacles, and the processes which were employed in an attempt 
to ameliorate them. It concludes with a policy prescription for breaking the vicious 
cycle of hurt, blame, and rising nationalism in the region.
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Introduction
Many long-running conflicts or post-conflict legacies give the appearance of being 
intractable for two reasons: first, rather than there being an objective historical 
truth about the conflict waiting to be uncovered, there are in fact competing 
perceptions and regimes of truth each held as sacrosanct by the different actors; 
second, actors have become so wedded to particular conflictual positions and 
roles, they are blinded to the shared interest in reconciliation and the benefits this 
entails. Certainly these conditions hold true for the conflictual relations between 
the countries of Northeast Asia. Yet such conflicts are not necessarily, intractable, 
and transformation of conflictual relationships, while difficult, is both possible 
and empirically demonstrable. This paper examines theoretical prescriptions and 
case studies where theory has been put into practice, in order to draw lessons for 
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addressing the challenges of transforming conflictual relationships in Northeast 
Asia. The focus is on policy prescription for steps which may be taken to break 
the vicious cycle of hurt, blame, and rising nationalism in the region.
One of the main challenges to transforming conflictual relationships in 
Northeast Asia is the enduring universal self-imaging of victimhood, and the 
apportioning of blame to other agencies. Indeed, all countries in the region have 
recent histories of massive human rights abuses by their own authorities, but also 
as a result of the actions of external agencies. Both Chinas, the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), and both Koreas, the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), count 
themselves as victims of Japanese imperialism, aggression, and massive human 
rights abuses. These self-perceptions are also part of a larger and longer historical 
discourse on colonization endured by these countries. Japan’s self-perception, on 
the other hand, is of an Asian champion standing up for the region and liberating 
other countries from European domination, for which it was punished in the 
most horrific way, not only with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
but also the firebombing of Tokyo, the annexation of Japan’s most northerly 
territories by Russia and the occupation of Japan by the United States. Japan feels 
further threatened by the rising military power and assertiveness of both the 
PRC and the DPRK. Furthermore, conflictual conditions are being exacerbated 
across the board by rising nationalism among the younger generations. Young 
people in Japan feel less responsible for the sins of their increasingly distant 
forefathers, while young people in China and Korea champion a new confidence 
and assertiveness on the international stage.
How then can these conflictual positions and contradictory perceptions 
be reconciled? First, we must understand the processes of position taking and 
perception formation. Thus this paper starts with the theoretical analysis of two 
independent causal variables: the process of foreign policy making and forming 
assumptions about the nature of the other, and how they contribute to the 
dependent variable of a conflictual relationship. Second, we must look to how 
these processes may be deconstructed in order to bring to the fore the concept 
of a harmony of interests and transformation of conflictual relationships. Thus 
the pioneering work of the Harvard Negotiation Project and John Burton is 
highlighted in the second analytical section. Third, we must look to practical 
examples where such reconciliation appears to have borne fruit, or holds the 
promise of bearing fruit. Finally, this paper presents policy prescription for 
breaking the conflictual cycle and constructing an enduring peace in Northeast 
Asia.
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Decisions, Positions, Perceptions, and Misperceptions
The processes of foreign policy decision making and forming assumptions 
about the nature of the “other” pose major challenges to reconciliation in 
Northeast Asia. The region remains a decidedly state-centric security operating 
environment, resistant to international concepts and norms revolving around 
universalism, solidarism, collective security, as well as human rights and human 
security and “is one of few areas in the world where most countries strongly 
defend traditional concepts of national sovereignty and firmly resist foreign 
intervention in the internal affairs of independent states” (Chu 2001, 1). In part, 
as a result of experiences of colonialism, “the collective autonomy and dignity 
of the state from foreign domination takes precedence over autonomy and 
dignity of the individual which lies at the core of human security” with Asian 
states remaining among the most ardent champions of Westphalian sovereignty 
(Acharya 2003, 9). As a result, international relations in the region remain 
adversarial and resistant to the generation of trust, a prerequisite to reconciliation 
and the transformation of conflictual relationships. Decision making tends to 
take place at the state level and in accordance with the defense of state-level 
positions and interests. Furthermore, there is a general perception of the “other” 
as necessarily adopting similar processes.
It is from this starting point that Graham Allison begins his classic work, 
Essence of Decision. His first model of decision making, the rational actor model, 
adopts the view of the state as unitary rational actor; that is to say, a single 
indivisible entity (similar to an individual human being) that makes choices on 
the basis of rational application of cost/benefit analysis with regard to a hierarchy 
of values and preferred outcomes. These choices are used in order to promote 
solutions to strategic problems with regard to maximizing utility, minimizing cost 
and achieving strategic goals. This leads to a “conception of international politics 
as ‘essentially bargaining situations’ in which alert, intelligent, coordinated 
nations speak and move in order to influence other nations by changing their 
expected payoffs” (Allison 1971, 22).
The influence of individual preferences, perceptions and morality is 
supposedly minimized by emphasizing the importance of the state as actor within 
this concept. If statesmen are rational and act in accordance with the needs of 
the society and national interest, then no matter who is at the helm, the ship 
will be steered in the same direction. Rational decision makers are expected to 
construct a hierarchy of preferred outcomes and then conduct a simple cost-
benefit analysis (in terms of national interest and resources) in order to determine 
which course of action to take. Because the output of decision making impacts 
on others, and their output becomes input for one’s own decision making, the 
operating environment can be described as strategic. Hence, the complexities of 
the decision-making process are simplified through the concept of a “black box of 
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decision.”
States do not, however, make decisions. Rather, statesmen at the head of 
states, or at the head of the constitutive bureaucratic elements that comprise 
the apparatus of the state, formulate policy on behalf of the state, and take up 
positions to represent the state, interpreting the interests of the state as best they 
can. Under such circumstances the perceptions of the decision-maker, far from 
being an irrelevance, are in fact key to the direction policy will ultimately take. 
In addition, decision makers are subject to internal pushes and pulls that may 
weight policy in what would appear to international observers to be an irrational 
direction.
The different perception filters through which actors view the world have 
considerable bearing not only upon how they reach their “rational” decisions, but 
even upon the processing of information upon which they will construct their 
preference hierarchies. At the national or societal level, perceptions are based on 
shared experiences and images, received wisdom, national historical projects and 
discourse, and social construction of truth. Perception affects decision-making 
rationality through self-imaging and what has become known as “perception of 
the other.” Consistency in policy can therefore be seen as a result of the strong 
tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming 
information to fit pre-existing images formed through national, organizational, 
and personal experience, as well as through planning and standard operating 
procedures (Jervis 1976, 117). Indeed, actors’ theories and images play a large 
part in determining what they notice. “In other words actors tend to perceive 
what they expect” (Jervis 1969, 240).
People tend to adopt the first image of their adversary that seems to fit the 
adversary’s actions, and are very reluctant to subsequently change this perception. 
This may not be an instinctive “first impression,” but may be the result of a 
“rational” decision. If the actor believes that their first, tentative guesses will soon 
be corrected if they are wrong and can be of assistance if they are right, they will 
not hesitate to make them. Unfortunately, the assumption that wrong guesses will 
soon be rectified is erroneous. Actors will continue a fair way down a blind alley 
before they realize that their basic assumption needs revision. This is due to the 
fact that they will ignore information that does not fit, twist it so that it confirms, 
or at least does not contradict their beliefs, and deny its validity, while “confirming 
evidence, by contrast, is quickly and accurately noted” (Jervis 1976, 143). Thomas 
Kuhn (1962, 23-24) noted similar processes at play when addressing the difficulty 
of achieving a paradigm shift in scientific understanding, in that the orthodox 
community will “attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively 
inflexible box” that the existing paradigm supplies, while new phenomena that do 
not fit into the box will often not be seen at all.
A number of general points can be made with regard to the impact of 
prejudicial, stereotypical, biased, or “partisan” perceptions upon decision making 
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in international negotiations. First, it is likely that the more uncertainty that 
surrounds the information upon which decision makers are formulating policy, 
the greater the impact of pre-existing theories and images upon interpretation 
of the data. If messages are sent from a different background of concerns and 
information than is possessed by the receiver, misunderstanding is more likely 
due to cultural, political, social, linguistic, historical, and cognitive dissonance. 
Second, the surer a decision maker is about the validity of their pre-existing 
theories and images, the greater the impact upon interpretation of the data. Third, 
the more effort has been expended by the decision maker in the construction of 
their pre-existing theories and images, the more likely they are to be “entrapped” 
by these “sunk costs,” and therefore the more resistant they are likely to be to new 
ideas or images. Sunk costs are the costs which have been expended, whether 
material resources or human effort, in constructing the current position, and 
which have a hold over the decision maker by virtue of their going to waste if the 
position is abandoned.
Indeed, sunk costs, entrapment and pre-existing policy decisions can 
essentially negate the rational decision-making process entirely. Models of non-
decision describe a situation wherein policy is only created through a process 
of “disjointed incrementalism” (i.e., small undirected steps), and that rather 
than decision making or decisive policy change, for the vast majority of the 
time “incremental drift,” or slight modifications of existing policy, is the norm 
(Baybrooke and Lindblom 1969, 223). Hence Herbert Simon (1991, 125) refers to 
“bounded rationality” wherein rather than being open to all rational alternatives, 
“what an individual learns in an organization is very much dependent on what 
is already known to (or believed by) other members of the organization.” Simon 
also introduced the concept of “satificing” (a combination of satisfying and 
sufficing), whereby any needle in the haystack is accepted rather than continuing 
to search for the sharpest, or the first, image which seems to fit the available data 
(Simon 1956, 129; 1957).
As a result of partisan perceptions, actors tend to overlook the fact that 
evidence consistent with their theories may also be consistent with other views 
or explanations for the actions of others. They also tend to overlook the fact 
that more than one interpretation or explanation can be placed upon their own 
actions. Actors tend to see others as more hostile than they are, and to interpret 
the signals of others in a more negative way than they were likely intended. We 
are familiar in all forms of international negotiation with the tendency towards 
“worst case” analysis, where it is considered rational to assume and prepare for 
the worst. If the effect of another’s action is to injure or threaten the actor, the 
actor is apt to believe that such was the other’s purpose and intent. On the other 
hand, actors tend to see their own actions and signals in the best possible light 
and are confused or hurt when others do not share this perception.
Ironically, international actors often perceive their negotiating partners as 
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more unitary and rational than they actually are. While actors are often very 
aware of their own internal political games, nevertheless they have a tendency to 
perceive the behavior of others (especially in the international environment) as 
more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated, and therefore more rational (in 
unitary rational actor terms) than is actually the case. Because a state gets most 
of its information about the other state’s policies from the other’s foreign office, 
it tends to take the foreign office’s position for the stand of the government as a 
whole, or worse, as representing the will of the society as a whole. In East Asia, 
in particular, history textbooks have had a similar impact: no matter how limited 
their distribution they are seen to represent the societal consensus, whereas they 
actually involve state-centric impositions, or minority perspectives.
Thus in order to make progress towards reconciliation, it is important 
to unpack the “black box of decision,” attempt understanding of the “other,” 
deconstruct the relationship between positions and interests, and increase the 
role played by non-state and sub-state actors. The next section attempts to go 
some way towards addressing these concerns by suggesting theoretical remedies 
for the practical challenges of securing a lasting peace in Northeast Asia.
Dealing with Positional and Perceptional Challenges
Negotiating partners, and those who analyze negations, must come to the 
realization that an actor’s interests are not necessarily the same as the positions 
they take (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991, 40-55). Positions are an actor’s demands, 
list of wants, or a description of where the actor stands on an issue. Underlying 
these positions are the reasons parties demand something: their needs, 
concerns, desires, hopes and fears. A negotiated agreement or reconciliation 
that satisfies the interests of all parties has a good chance of lasting success, and 
is also achievable, even when parties take apparently irreconcilable positions. 
Furthermore, we need to take into account that “where you stand depends on 
where you sit.” This maxim points to the importance of understanding an actors 
official position and background in order to predict where they may stand on a 
certain issue, and what might constitute the interests they are trying to fulfill.
Robert Putnam (1988) first articulated the theory that international 
agreements are the product of negotiations at both the internal domestic and 
external international level: a “two level game.” Likewise Graham Allison’s 
second model of decision making, the “organizational process model,” depicts 
policy as the product of “large semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations” (Allison 
1971, 67). Allison presents the “bureaucratic politics model,” or model three, 
as a second alternative to the rational actor model. In this model bureaucrats 
and governmental players bargain with each other to define what is the national 
interest and the best way for the national interest to be fulfilled. The motivations 
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for individual players are shaped by triple-tiered hierarchies of preferences: by 
their own conceptions of what is the public good or the national interest, by 
their own organizational affiliation and its needs and interests, and by personal 
interests and career ambitions. Thus, foreign policy decisions are the result of 
negotiations among skilled policy-making practitioners and the outcome of 
internal political machinations (ibid., 146).
Karl Deutsch refers to a simple cascade model of national decision making 
consisting of five levels, each level a distinct reservoir of public or elite opinion 
and each reservoir linked to a particular complex of social institutions and 
status groups. The first of these is the social and economic elite, which does 
not form a simple monolithic group, but rather is connected by a dense net of 
multiple ties, links, and channels of communication. The second is the political 
and governmental elite, which is also not monolithic. Third we have the media 
of mass communication, fourth the network of local opinion leaders, and fifth 
the politically relevant strata of the population at large. Streams of information 
move downward in cascade fashion, from higher-level communications systems 
to lower-level ones. Each of the five groups, however, has its own memories and 
its own measure of autonomy. Each can reject, ignore, or reinterpret unpalatable 
messages. Each is capable of innovation and initiative. And each can also 
feed back a stream of information upward to some or all of the higher-level 
groups (Deutsch 1978, 119-122). When combined with the external operating 
environment examined through a relationship mapping exercise of all the players 
involved in the game, these streams of information help explain why leaders 
might feel the need to act in ways contrary to those dictated by a simple cost-
benefit analysis of their positions.
Understanding where your own interests truly lie will help establish what 
you really want from a negotiation, and may help you get what you need. In 
addition, however, one must uncover the interests which lie behind the positions 
taken by other actors. First and foremost, most simply put, we need to try to look 
at the negotiation or conflict from the other person’s perspective. This does not 
mean agreeing, ultimately, with their position, but it does mean that we should 
make every effort to understand it. We are trying to comprehend, rather than to 
“buy into,” their reasoning by placing ourselves in their shoes, or in their seat, and 
thereby gain an insight into their mind-set.
Engaging in such a process can, in actual fact, be extremely beneficial to our 
own position. The more we learn about others’ concerns, the more likely we are 
to consider elements that had previously escaped our notice, the more likely we 
are to change our own minds, and the more likely we are to revise our thinking. 
Rethinking our policy may well be a benefit rather than a cost of understanding 
an adversary’s point of view. With greater knowledge we might reduce the area 
of conflict and increase the chance of advancing our newly enlightened self-
interest. We might also discard policies that are doomed to fail, or encounter 
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such resistance from the other that they become irrational (although we did not 
know this to be the case before we increased our strategic comprehension) before 
becoming entrapped through sunk costs. Indeed, Kal Holsti (1991, 158) informs 
us that “the more intense the interaction between the parties, the more important 
it is to incorporate perceptional data into the analysis.”
Theorists such as Roger Fisher (1991; 1997) and John Burton (1969; 1990a; 
1990b) have tried to formalize and model this process. The first step is to assess 
our own assumptions about the negotiation or conflict, and the data upon 
which we base them (sometimes called “assessing the first position”). Next, it is 
important to “assess the second position”: consider what the other parties see 
(their partisan perceptions), why they see it that way (their background, emotions 
and motives), and the interests which lie behind their positions (Fisher et al. 
1997, 48-51). Both of these forms of assessment are carried out through a process 
of “cognitive mapping.” We address our cognitive maps and infer those of other 
parties by studying assertions and causal beliefs. Why do we perceive the actions 
of others in a particular way, and, given our understanding of what they believe, 
or state they believe, how are they likely to perceive these actions of ours? In other 
words, what are our assumptions, why do we make them, is there any evidence 
that does not support our assumptions, and are there alternative explanations for 
our perceived reality which may fit the available data equally well or even better? 
This has been modeled by the Assumptions/Data Tool shown in Figure 1.
The third step is to interact with the other parties in order to test our 
understanding of their positions. For Fisher and his associates at the Harvard 
Negotiation Project, this has tended to take the form of role-play workshops 
through which parties are engaged directly or indirectly in negotiations. 
Communication forms the core of the Harvard approach. Parties engage in 
“active listening” whereby the positions and underlying interests of other actors 
are directly solicited. Communication also forms the bedrock of improved 
Figure 1. The Assumptions/Data Tool
A. Assumptions
What are the core assumptions about the 
conflict?
B. Base Data
On what data have the assumptions been 
based?
D. Alternative Assumptions
Taking the additional data into account, what 
might be some alternative conclusions about 
the conflict?
C. Nonconforming Data
What additional data might be taken into 
account that may be inconsistent with the 
core assumptions?
Source: adapted from Fisher et al. 1997, 49.
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relationships, which for Fisher et al. (1997) is an important strategic objective 
in its own right, independent of the pursuit of each actor’s individual interest 
satisfaction.
For followers of John Burton, the process has tended to involve a problem-
solving workshop to which all parties with the capacity to affect the outcome of 
negotiations are invited, where their common problems are jointly addressed 
as collective action rather than adversarial zero-sum negotiations. These parties 
will have been identified through the construction of a relationship map as 
detailed above. This inclusive approach means including non-state actors as 
participants. It also uses non-state actors in key organizational roles due to their 
non-confrontational and non-zero-sum positioning. For instance, the workshop 
is often organized and held by academics in a university seminar setting. In the 
workshop each party must explain the other’s position to the satisfaction of the 
other (Burton 1969). Again, it is not necessary to agree with the position of the 
other, merely to clarify. This in itself helps to build understanding and roll back 
misperceptions.
In the final step, given this new understanding, rather than focusing on how 
to achieve our own goals, we consider whether there are other ways in which we 
can ensure the substantive interests (not positions) of the other party, with the 
aim of a more lasting settlement and maintenance of a long-term cooperative 
relationship. Both Fisher and Burton advise us to deconstruct the nature of the 
conflict itself and the identity of the participants in order to work towards a 
lasting peaceful relationship. Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991, 17) advocate that we 
“separate the people from the problem” in order to reduce hostility and encourage 
the notion of negotiators as joint problem-solvers rather than opponents. 
Negotiations take place in the context of long-term relationships and 
through communication. The negotiating sessions themselves are the venue for 
communication. Without effective two-way communication, negotiators would 
have limited knowledge about the other side’s concerns, interests, and preferences 
on the negotiating agenda. On the other hand, negotiators can improve their 
mutual gains through exploring their interests. Meanwhile, it is also important 
to keep in mind Burton’s conclusion that people most commonly come into 
conflict because they feel that their identity is not being recognized, that they 
are not being treated with the dignity and respect due them as individual human 
beings and the bearers of rights and needs (Burton 1990b); this is true even 
when the conflict appears to be about something much more material such as 
land or resources. The next section looks at conflictual case studies where such 
approaches have been used.
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Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Case Studies
This section analyzes a number of seemingly intractable conflictual situations 
drawn from the history of international diplomacy and the author’s own practical 
experiences in the field, where the processes of reconciliation and relationship 
transformation were faced with similar challenges to those found in the 
Northeast Asian operating environment. In each case some of the theoretical 
steps advocated by the Fisher School and John Burton were put into action, and 
at least held some promise of ameliorating the situation.
Land for Peace: The Sinai
The conflictual relationship between Israel and Arab nations has been perceived 
as perhaps the most intractable in the contemporary strategic operating 
environment. Essentially this is because it is often viewed as zero-sum, with both 
sides laying claim to the same territory, committing gross violations of human 
rights, denying the other’s right to exist and thereby posing an existential threat to 
the other. There have, however, been moments of reconciliation. These occurred 
when processes similar to those advocated by Fisher and Burton have been put 
into practice. This was the basis of the historic “land for peace” approach to the 
conflict between the Israelis and Egyptians (and later other Arab peoples) that 
has come closer than any other process to ensuring peace in the Middle East. 
The land for peace formula appeared for the first time in UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 in 1967 in the aftermath of the Six Day War, and was first used as 
the basis for Israel’s peace treaty with Egypt in 1979. The initial military conflict 
had left the Sinai Peninsula in Israeli hands. Over the following four years (1967-
70) a limited war of attrition was waged between Egypt and Israel over possession 
of the territory, resulting in some one million internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
in Egypt. In 1973 Egypt launched major military operations as part of the Yom 
Kippur War aimed at recapturing Sinai. In this they were unsuccessful.
As a result of the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords between the two 
countries, Israel withdrew from the Peninsula. Reconciliation achieved what had 
proven impossible through force of arms. The process for this transformation 
involved recognition that while the positions of both sides were that military 
occupation of the Peninsula was of vital importance to national security, this 
was not in fact wherein lay the interests of either side. For Egypt, vital national 
interest involved reunification with the homeland of territory which had been 
Egyptian for millennia. For Israel it lay in not having Egyptian forces so close to 
the Israeli border given repeated attacks from that quarter. By returning the Sinai 
to Egyptian control, but limiting the presence of Egyptian forces, both interests 
were fulfilled. In addition, there were mutual gains in terms of peace, including 
Israeli tourism to Sinai.
A key role was played by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Foreign Minister 
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under President Anwar Sadat. He accompanied Sadat on his historic trip to 
Jerusalem in 1977, and was an architect of the Camp David Accords which led to 
the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979 (BBC 2016). As a minority Coptic Christian 
married into a Jewish family, in a predominantly Muslim country recently at 
war with Israel, it is perhaps not surprising that Boutros-Ghali was able to look 
beyond state-centric political power positioning, and consider instead the shared 
interests of the peoples of the Middle East. He was able to separate the people 
from the problems, and also to address the assumptions of his own side in the 
negotiations at Camp David. Later, as Secretary General of the United Nations, he 
was to continue to champion peace and the rights of peoples, even at the expense 
of so-called national interest (Boutros-Ghali 1992).
Land for Peace: The Oslo Accords
Land for peace aims at fulfilling some of the desires of others, thereby reducing 
the hostility and level of threat they in turn pose to you. This then is a key 
element of transforming a conflictual relationship by tackling mutually exclusive 
positions and uncovering shared and complementary interests. Thus one category 
of challenges listed in the introduction and theoretical analysis sections, that of 
positional obstacles, was successfully overcome by the land for peace negotiation 
process. The perceptional challenges listed above have also been tackled, however, 
by more recent incarnations.
The principle reappeared in the peace agreement, or Oslo Accords, between 
Israel and representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
finalized in Oslo, Norway on August 20, 1993, according to which the Israelis 
would hand over most of the territories they had formerly occupied, which were 
to form the foundations of a future Palestinian state. In return relations were to 
be normalized, terrorist attacks upon Israel were to cease, and each side pledged 
recognition of the other. Thus again positions were sacrificed in order to secure 
interests and mutual gains. However, the Accords also essentially constituted 
a real-world attempt at a Burtonian problem-solving workshop. They were the 
result of secret negotiations between representatives of Israel and the PLO, about 
which nothing was released to the media until agreement had been secured 
from both parties. Both sides had to abandon their partisan perceptions and 
accept the right of the “other” not only to exist, but also to engage in negotiations 
as representatives of their respective peoples before such engagement could 
even begin. This mutual legitimization and recognition helped transform the 
conflictual relationship.
Although, as is clear from the continuation of hostilities, the process is 
far from complete, any failure has in all probability been due to the lack of 
recognition of the decision-making complexities of the parties involved rather 
than limitations of the Assumption/Data Tool, the problem solving workshop, or 
the basic formula of land for peace. Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991, 37) advocate 
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that mutual gains not be left on the table, yet at the time of the breakthrough 
in negotiations final resolution on knotty problems such as the ultimate status 
of the Palestinian political entity, the borders of Israel and Palestine, the Israeli 
settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the question of Israel’s military presence in 
and control over the remaining territories after the recognition of Palestinian 
autonomy by Israel, and the Palestinian right of return, were left behind.
Furthermore, Burton had advocated the inclusion in talks of all interested 
parties who have the capacity to affect the outcome of a peace process. In 
particular it is important to involve extremists, as they are likely to be most 
successful in selling any agreement back to domestic constituencies (the problem 
of re-entry). The Oslo Accords only involved moderates on both sides. As a 
result, on the Palestinian side the relatively moderate Palestinian Liberation 
Organization faction of Fatah was outmaneuvered by the much more radical 
Hamas organization which opposed the peace process. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated in 1995 by a Jewish radical at the end of 
a peace rally in Tel Aviv.
Nagaland
In Nagaland, in the northeast of India, indigenous groups have been waging a 
low-intensity ethnic separatist insurgency for more than 60 years. As became 
clear during a visit by the author (in January 2013) to run a Burtonian problem-
solving workshop with representatives of both sides to the conflict as well as civil 
society groups, the position of the rebels was that nothing short of independence 
was acceptable. Their perception of the Indian government was that the 
authorities were merely bent on stripping the Northeastern states (Nagaland 
and also Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, where significant numbers 
of Naga live) of their resources and redirecting profits to New Delhi. They saw 
the New Delhi authorities as patronizing, neocolonial, and even racist. For the 
Indian government, concessions were seen as dangerous since they could not 
risk encouraging other separatist movements in such a large, heterogeneous 
country. A breakthrough only became possible when all sides started to shift from 
positional bargaining to interest-based negotiations, and to efforts to understand 
and respect the position of the “other.”
Although the peace treaty with the largest faction of Naga insurgents has 
only freshly been signed (August 2015), with details of the transition still sketchy, 
nevertheless it seems that both sides have shifted in their positions, the better 
to fulfill their interests. There has also been a clear shift in the perceptions of 
the “other” for both sides, and this has been reflected in their language use. The 
rebels appear no longer to be calling for complete secession, but rather for the 
development of local resources in the interests of the local communities, and 
recognition of greater community rights (BBC 2015b). At the same time, Indian 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi described the accord between his government 
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and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland as “historic,” noting that he had 
“the deepest admiration for the great Naga people for their extraordinary support 
to the peace efforts” and expressing the hope that the resolution of the country’s 
oldest insurgency was a signal to other groups to give up their weapons (BBC 
2015a). Thuingaleng Muivah, the chief of the main rebel group, the National 
Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), thanked Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi for “understanding the problems faced by the Nagas,” while Mr. Modi 
acknowledged that the problem festered so long because India and the Nagas 
failed to “understand each other” (BBC 2015b).
The Northern Ireland Peace Process
The conflict surrounding Northern Ireland was, for a long time, seen to be every 
bit as intractable as those in the Middle East or Northeast Asia. There was a 
territorial zero-sum game with Northern Ireland being viewed as part of the 
United Kingdom (UK) by one community in the province and its international 
supporters; and being viewed as part of an unjustly divided Irish state entity 
by the other community and its supporters. There were also most certainly 
competing regimes of the truth, with each community championing its own 
foundational myth, perpetually reinvigorating and reinventing its history of 
struggle against an intractable foe blamed for all of society’s evils and suffering, 
and claiming that the “other” posed an existential threat. The conflict was further 
exacerbated by religious, linguistic, ethnic, and socio-economic divides between 
the two communities. The long-running conflict—essentially a civil war which 
spilled over into Britain, the Irish Republic, mainland Europe, and even North 
America—was euphemistically referred to as “the troubles.”
As the administering power, the UK tried a number of state-centric solutions, 
including partition of conflictual neighborhoods, the deployment of troops, and 
judicial solutions of dubious legality, as well as state-to-state negotiations with 
the Irish Republic. All these measures were, however, doomed to fail, until the 
governments of Ireland and the UK brought all the major actors, including non-
state actors as diverse as political parties, civil society organizations, and even 
terrorists, into the problem-solving approach, as of course Burton would have 
advocated.
Ultimately the process of engagement with all the parties culminated in 
the Good Friday Agreement, two interrelated documents, signed in Belfast on 
Good Friday, April 10, 1998. These documents were a multi-party agreement 
to which most of Northern Ireland’s political parties had signed up, and an 
international agreement between the British and Irish governments (the British-
Irish Agreement), which together required action by all the stakeholders, national 
governments, local political parties, civil society, and terrorist groups on both 
sides of the sectarian divide. The interests of all these parties were addressed. 
Strand 1 contained provisions relating to the status and system of government 
42 Brendan M. Howe
of Northern Ireland within the UK. Strand 2 addressed the relationship 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Strand 3 reflected on the 
relationship between the Republic of Ireland and the UK. Many of the underlying 
grievances and interests of parties were addressed by provisions relating to civil 
and cultural rights, decommissioning of weapons, justice, and policing.
Although the Agreement was no panacea, and there have been both 
breakdowns of governance in Northern Ireland and some isolated cease-
fire violations, the success of the peace process in transforming conflictual 
relationships can be measured by the overwhelming support for it both during 
the Agreement ratification process and since. The Agreement was approved by 
voters in both the North and South of the island of Ireland in two referendums 
held on May 22, 1998. In Northern Ireland, voters were asked whether they 
supported the multi-party agreement. In the Republic of Ireland, voters were 
asked whether they would allow the state to sign the agreement and allow 
necessary constitutional changes to facilitate it. Both referendums received very 
significant “yes” votes. The process also brought the communities into contact as 
joint problem solvers rather than adversaries, and facilitated recognition of the 
interests, needs, and fears of the “other” rather than their demonization. Again, 
the people were separated from the problems, and misperceptions corrected. 
These days the province has been transformed almost beyond recognition, 
and despite ongoing socio-economic and governance challenges, the people of 
Northern Ireland count themselves the happiest in the UK (Independent 2015).
The Korean Peninsula
Finally, in a case study closer to home in terms of both geography and chronology, 
the recent (August 2015) inter-Korean crisis on the Peninsula offers valuable 
insights as to the dangers of playing the traditional blame game, but also points to 
the benefits of a negotiated agreement on language to be used in a reconciliation 
report. On August 9, 2015, two South Korean soldiers were wounded after 
stepping on landmines that had allegedly been laid by North Korean forces next 
to a ROK guard post on the southern side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). 
South Korea responded by restarting propaganda broadcasts from loudspeakers 
at the DMZ, a practice that both sides had previously agreed to discontinue. On 
August 20, North Korea fired a single 14.5 mm anti-aircraft shell at the offending 
speakers. South Korea responded by firing multiple shells from a 155 mm direct 
fire weapon.
North Korea, of course, has a long history of brinksmanship, and of 
prioritizing national security, even to the extent of adopting an official “military 
first,” or Seon’gun, policy platform. Actions such as restarting its nuclear program, 
testing nuclear devices and missiles, and in 2010, sinking the South Korean naval 
corvette Cheonan, and shelling the South Korean island Yeonpyeong near the 
Northern Limit Line (NLL) have heightened the trepidation of near neighbors 
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and the wider international community. It is not necessarily the increasing 
strength of North Korea that threatens, however, but rather Pyongyang’s 
increasing weakness; an “insecurity dilemma” rather than a security dilemma, 
where in addition to posing a threat to its own people, the insecure state’s 
vulnerability is projected outwards as a diversionary and unifying tactic causing 
international uncertainty and instability as well as security threats to neighboring 
states. Diversionary international crises and conflict generation, in fact, has a 
lengthy pedigree, particularly among authoritarian regimes. Other well-known 
incidents include Indonesia’s military confrontation (konfrontasi) with Malaysia 
in 1963 when President Sukarno’s political control and power were waning, and 
the decision by the military junta of Argentina to invade the UK-administered 
Falkland Islands in 1982.
In the most recent crisis, however, it seems that democratic South Korea 
may have had as much, or maybe even more, interest in escalating matters. There 
are a number of important critiques which can be made regarding the sequence 
of events. First, landmines along the DMZ are subject to spontaneous movement 
due to thin soil and adverse weather conditions, and it is by no means certain 
when and where these mines were laid. Second, South Korea’s responses may 
not have been proportionate: restarting a propaganda mechanism which had 
previously contributed to the escalation of tensions on the Peninsula, violating 
one of the few agreements between the two sides which up to that point had 
actually held up, and responding to a single small caliber shot with multiple 
rounds of a much larger caliber. Third the diversion of public attention towards 
the deteriorating situation at the DMZ came at a time when reports were due 
on alleged electoral manipulation by the governing party and the National 
Intelligence Service.
Thus both sides could be accused of putting regime and/or national security 
considerations before the wellbeing of their citizens. On the other hand, a 
significant positive can be taken from the way the crisis was ultimately defused. 
In the final wording of the joint statement released by the two Koreas after a 
mammoth crisis summit meeting, North Korea expressed “regret” for what 
had happened to the South Korean soldiers. This stopped short of the apology 
originally demanded by South Korea, but at least acknowledged suffering and 
hurt. Importantly, it did not explicitly attribute blame. Thus both sides could find 
the space to back down from the confrontation with dignity. Indeed, the wording 
of the document was such that both sides could claim victory on behalf of their 
constituents.
Of course this is not to imply that the resolution of this particular issue has 
brought ultimate reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula significantly closer. 
What the meeting did demonstrate, however, was what is possible when two 
adversaries meet to address a problem and find a negotiated agreement which 
at least addresses the vital interests of both sides tolerably well. Furthermore, by 
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taking this first step, other confidence-building and socialization measures, such 
as family reunions, may be relaunched with more optimism. Hopefully such 
measures will ultimately lead to a perceptional shift.
Lessons and Prescriptions for Northeast Asia
As detailed above, all countries in Northeast Asia have a self-perception of 
victimization by others and an ongoing belief that others pose an existential 
threat. Any proposal for future initiatives aimed at providing reconciliation and 
securing a lasting peace must address these perceptions. The first step towards 
this is to acknowledge that all communities have indeed been hurt, and to that 
extent are victims, without taking the antagonistic step of placing blame. Indeed, 
all the peoples of Northeast Asia have been victimized by both domestic and 
foreign agents of oppression.
This fact may, ironically, facilitate reconciliation for a number of reasons. 
First, the awareness of shared experience facilitates mutual understanding and the 
growth of empathy. Second, in terms of collective problem-solving rather than 
positional negotiations, this approach constructs domestic and foreign oppression 
and violation of human rights as a common challenge and enemy against which 
all the countries of the region can unite. Third, in combining all the sources of 
suffering in the region, the adversarial and blame-focused examination of each 
individual instance is diluted, while its humanitarian imperative remains in force.
As demonstrated in the above analysis, it is vital to separate the people from 
the problems, but also to distinguish between real interests and mere strategic 
positions. These objectives become more achievable through confidence-
building, communication, and ultimately the construction of good relationships 
between the peoples of Northeast Asia. A major component of such processes 
is to hand the initiative to non-state, trans-state, or sub-state actors, as state-to-
state engagement is inherently positional, and the interests primarily defended 
are those of national security and prestige rather than wellbeing, reconciliation, 
relationship transformation, and healing. Furthermore, state actors are more 
likely to be irrecoverably entrapped by sunk costs, and constrained by the 
operational straight-jackets of standard operating procedures. Thus diplomatic 
negotiations may be suitable for conflict management, or even resolution, but not 
for the transformation of underlying conflictual relationships. It is difficult for 
any state-level actor to engage in the degree of out-of-the-box thinking required.
Indeed, one trend in contemporary diplomatic theory and practice does 
emphasize such non-traditional thinking. Public diplomacy has grown in stature 
among a number of key states in the international system, including in South 
Korean diplomatic circles. Thus for Nicholas Cull, “the significance of publics 
in foreign policy may be the defining characteristic of foreign policy in our age” 
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(2013, 17). Likewise, for Paul Sharp, “public diplomacy, the process by which 
direct relations are pursued with a country’s people to advance the interests and 
extend the values of those being represented, appears to be an idea whose time 
has come” (2005, 106).
The Republic of Korea, has been a somewhat late convert to the concept, 
officially endorsing it only in 2010 (Ma, Song, and Moore 2012). Yet Korea 
has become, in a relatively short space of time, an enthusiastic contributor to 
the discourse and a proponent of related policy initiatives (Cull 2013, 19). The 
national government of South Korea has primarily employed a limited state-
centric interpretation of public diplomacy whereby the national state apparatus 
focuses on projecting a good image of the country in order to influence external 
public opinion. As such it has much in common with the concept of soft power, 
and indeed, the government of the Republic of Korea uses the terms pretty much 
interchangeably (Huh 2012).
There are, however, unfortunate connotations with soft power terminology 
and usage, and with the state-centricity of these interpretations. “Power” itself 
can be seen to have negative or even pejorative connotations, and concerns 
remain that when directly wielded by the representatives of a state, there can 
be significant blurring of the boundaries between soft power and hard power. 
Although it can clearly be wielded by non-state actors, as mentioned above, 
and used to target the populations of other countries, soft power also seems to 
follow traditional diplomatic and strategic models of interaction, viewing actors 
as unitary and rational. There is always a danger that the overt pursuit of public 
diplomacy and soft power comes off as, at best, unsubtle propaganda, and at 
worst, as meddling in the internal affairs of partner states.
If public diplomacy is seen simply as a way for states and statesmen 
strategically to target the populations of other countries, it is unlikely to get 
much further than attempts to “win hearts and minds,” or simply being labelled 
government “spin.” “Winning” implies psychological operations aimed at 
manipulating or even coercing the public of a target state in a manner almost 
as controversial as hard power operations, and is just as likely to generate a 
negative backlash by those who feel they are being manipulated. Thus, even if the 
nomenclature plays well with politicians and domestic publics, there are strategic 
problems with the current emphasis of the government of Korea on the use of 
public diplomacy as an element soft power, or as a way of winning the hearts and 
minds of overseas publics.
Even the use of the term “public diplomacy” by official organs of a state 
can be problematic, as it comes with all the baggage attached to other forms 
of diplomacy. That is to say, it is an overt attempt to project the interests of the 
state. Recent developments in the discourse, therefore, reject too great a linkage 
between public diplomacy and national power projection. For Alan Henrikson, 
the assimilation of publicly-conducted diplomacy to soft power is a conceptual 
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mistake, and far too reductionist, because a diplomacy that is expected to have 
public appeal and to win favor for a country must rely on the moral, political, 
and intellectual assent of the populations addressed by it. “Most publics cannot 
be entirely won over – either coerced or co-opted – by intimations of power, 
however subliminal or politely veiled” (Henrikson 2005, 68).
Non-state actors, therefore, are key players in the creation of non-
threatening public diplomacy. Indeed, public-to-public diplomacy rather than 
state-to-public diplomacy is called for in order to facilitate the processes of 
conflict transformation and reconciliation. That being said, in order to create 
the requisite shared body of knowledge and commitment, one party needs to 
provide leadership, but also to remain as impartial as possible. Previous attempts, 
despite good intentions, have tended to degenerate into using historical narratives 
to justify contemporary positions on territorial disputes, or to place blame 
for historical wrongs. Here we could learn from Burton’s approach, and invite 
academic representatives from all the countries in the region to a workshop to 
address the issues of human suffering, and to identify the historical period on 
which the project will focus its energies (starting as early as the late 19th century, 
potentially ending as late as the contemporary operating environment).
After the initial academic meeting to address the parameters of the 
investigation and acknowledgement of hurt, the project could be expanded 
in three directions: first, continuation of the academic project resulting in the 
publication of a universally agreed textbook; second, continuation of discussions 
by political and bureaucratic entities resulting in a joint declaration on human 
security in the region, acknowledging the dismal catalogue of human suffering 
while all sides pledge never to allow such things to happen again; and third, 
engagement of civil societies in each country, in particular the youth, in events 
aimed at breaking down barriers, facilitating understanding, and promoting 
reconciliation.
On the academic front, by addressing both domestic and foreign gross 
violations of human rights during the agreed timeframe, a larger degree of 
hurt can be acknowledged, while a greater degree of distance from blame can 
be maintained. A common textbook would, therefore, include the suffering of 
the ordinary Japanese citizens at the hands of American, Russian, and Japanese 
forces and administrations, without pointing fingers at those who may generally 
be considered to blame. Korean hurt would be acknowledged in terms of the 
suffering under colonialization, during World War II (including comfort women, 
slave labor, conscription, etc.), as a result of the division of the Peninsula, and 
under domestic authoritarian regimes. The suffering of the Chinese people under 
the aegis of European and Japanese imperialism, during civil and international 
wars, and as the result of historic mismanagement could also be addressed.
A further Burtonian progression would be to require humanitarian tragedies 
in each country to be addressed by academics other than those from that country. 
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Hence, a Japanese academic would write about South Korean suffering in the 
agreed timeframe, a Chinese academic would write about Japanese suffering, and 
a South Korean would write about Chinese suffering. This could be expanded to 
include North Korea and Taiwan. This is, of course, a very different proposal from 
the national unified history textbook projects launched throughout the region, 
but most prominently, and recently, in Japan and South Korea, in which policy 
makers attempt to rewrite a historical narrative. These controversial efforts are 
the exact opposite of the process proposed here.
On the policy front, again learning from the Burtonian approach, a track two 
or track three institution could hold a series of workshops for policy makers. The 
talks would be kept confidential with nothing listed as agreed until everything 
had been agreed. This gives a further incentive for making concessions. These 
workshops should not begin with a detailed agenda, but should rather be 
described and run as research seminars that have an open agenda to be shaped 
by the participants. Likely topics to be addressed, however, would include the 
origins of conflict in the region, its underlying issues, and obstacles to resolution, 
as well as matters of trust, how to reduce tension, and what confidence-building 
measures or de-escalation tactics would be effective (Maisse 2003).
In the second stage of problem solving, each party will ultimately, as detailed 
above, have to explain the position of the other to the other’s satisfaction. Thus, 
at this point, panelists should try to provide some bridge into this second and 
more productive stage of the workshop. It is at this point that Fisheresque “active 
listening” takes place—with participants asking of each other why they feel the 
way they do about certain issues—until sufficient comprehension is generated 
of opposing views, and the reasoning behind them, to allow representation of 
another participant’s position to their satisfaction. Interests are separated from 
positions, and people are separated from problems, in order to allow the various 
sides to come together to address the conflicts as problems which must be jointly 
addressed through collaborative efforts rather than as adversarial problems. The 
parties are invited to explore the central issues of their conflict and search for 
solutions that do not require any of the parties to compromise their basic interests 
or needs. Appealing to “solutions” that the various participants identified in 
earlier statements, facilitators lead the discussion and explore various possibilities 
for ending the conflict in question. This is the process of option generation 
identified by the Harvard Negotiation Project.
By this time, if nothing more, the participants will have developed a strong 
understanding of what the obstacles to resolution are, and should emerge 
from the workshop with the feeling that they have a deeper understanding of 
their conflict and some ideas about moving toward resolution. They should 
recognize that continued problem-solving, confidence-building, negotiating, 
and relationship-building endeavors are much more persuasive than their best 
alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNAs). Because a single workshop 
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is unlikely to include all the relevant parties or deal with all the issues, a series 
of meetings may be necessary. But even a single workshop can create new 
opportunities for communication between groups of antagonists.
Depending on the level of the participants, the eventual end product could 
be a joint declaration of heads of cities, provinces, or governments expressing 
a commitment to defend the human security of their populations against all 
who may threaten it. At the very least, the experience of these negotiations, 
combined with the active listening they will require, should serve to de-escalate 
hostile rhetoric. The most important task faced by the facilitators is to listen to 
the parties and analyze the nature of the issues in conflict as well as the obstacles 
to resolution. “Because the central issues often go beyond those portrayed in 
the parties’ public positions, consultants must listen for hidden agendas and 
unacknowledged resentments” (Maisse 2003).
On the civil society front, educational youth-based projects involving 
student exchange, visits to commemorative sites, youth conferences, simulation 
exercises and debate competitions, as well as pairing students from different 
countries to produce joint reports, could all greatly contribute to a de-escalation 
of nationalism and hostility among the younger generations. Student (and 
perhaps faculty) exchanges within the region could constitute an important 
avenue of civil society interaction. Ultimately, an education program which sees 
students spend semesters in each of the countries of Northeast Asia would make 
a tremendously beneficial contribution to reconciliation and the transformation 
of conflictual relationships. This would follow a similar sort of structure to the 
European Erasmus programs wherein students study at least three months or do 
an internship for a period of at least two months to an academic year in another 
European country. Less ambitiously, civil society and local governmental actors 
could sponsor youth exchange and interaction programs in sport, debating, 
Model UN, Model APEC, etc.
The aim of all of these programs is to facilitate communication, foster 
understanding, decrease xenophobia, and contribute to confidence building 
leading to the generation of a cooperative culture among the region’s future 
leaders. Any one, or all of these project and tracks could be pursued after the 
hosting of the initial, foundational workshop, in collaboration with academic 
research institutes at some of the top regional universities. While the costs 
involved would be fairly limited, the ultimate contributions are substantial.
Conclusion
Northeast Asian conflicts have been seen as among the most intractable in the 
world. Conflicting perceptions and regimes of the truth combine with positional 
negotiating postures and the primacy of the state in regional security and foreign 
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policy-making. Yet a wide body of literature, as well as a growing number of 
real-world cases have revealed methodologies for unpacking the “black box of 
decision,” understanding the “other,” deconstructing the relationship between 
positions and interests, and increasing the role played by non-state and sub-state 
actors. These include negotiation and problem solving workshops engaging in 
active listening, use of assumption/data tools, and a focus on communication and 
relationship building.
This paper has analyzed systematically potential policy prescription for 
steps which may be taken to break the vicious cycle of hurt, blame, and rising 
nationalism in the region. These include that a truly “public” take on public 
diplomacy should be the diplomacy of the publics, not the exercise of “soft” 
power by state actors in order to exert influence over others, and that a Burtonian 
problem-solving approach could lead to workshops and ultimately joint output 
in the academic, policy, and civil society communities. While none of these 
measures is viewed as a panacea for the region’s problems, especially given the 
entrenched resistance of policy elites, they all represent the kind of “out-of- 
the-box” thinking, and out of the “black box” foreign policy analysis, required 
to break the current deadlock. At a minimum, their inclusiveness should 
stimulate communication and hence lead to better understanding and ultimately 
relationship building, and even the transformation of conflictual relationships.
Notes
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of the Asian Journal of 
Peacebuilding for their constructive comments. The article draws on work commissioned 
by the Seoul Institute for the Seoul Metropolitan Government, and is reproduced here by 
their permission.
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